Since the end of October, police have been standing in front of the Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw. Protests with Polish flags. A president who turns around mid-flight from Senegal in the middle of the night and forces his way in. A judge who “suspends” the president of the tribunal.
On one side: Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his pro-European coalition. They say they are restoring the rule of law after years of PiS influence. On the other side: President Karol Nawrocki (PiS ally) and the opposition. They speak of a “forcible takeover” and a “coup d’état”.
This is not a new conflict. It is a new wave in a conflict that has been running since 2015. And it is not just about judges: it determines who will be able to legally test or block the 2027 elections.
What was already there
In 2015 the outgoing Sejm (under PO-PSL) elected five judges to the tribunal, including two seats that only became vacant later. The tribunal itself later ruled that three of those five appointments were valid, two were not. PiS ignored that, elected its own judges, and President Duda swore them in. Laws followed that hindered the functioning of the tribunal. EU courts later questioned its independence.
Since 2023 the Tusk government has been trying to reverse that. Nawrocki, narrowly elected in 2025, refuses to administer the oath to several judges elected by the Sejm. The sitting president of the tribunal, Bogdan Święczkowski (from the PiS period), does not allow them in.
On 30 October 2026 Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska (elected by the Sejm, oath not accepted by the president) posted a notice on the website: she suspends Święczkowski and his deputy for one month and takes over. Police appeared. Nawrocki turned around, arrived around 1 a.m. and went inside. The tribunal’s X account spoke of an unlawful takeover of the website.
The pattern
2015: one majority appoints “in advance”, the other majority cancels and fills the seats.
Years after: silence in media outside Poland, while the tribunal largely stops functioning or becomes politicized.
2023: new government promises restoration.
2025: new president blocks.
2026: physical confrontation in front of the building, online stories about “rule of law” versus “coup”.
The same mechanism as in other dossiers. First institutional capture. Then silence or framing. Then a new document or a new action. Then the opposite framing again.
What this means
A suspension on a website is not an irrevocable court ruling.
A nocturnal entry by the president is not proof of a coup.
A police cordon is not proof of restored independence.
What is established: the authority of the judges has been contested since 2015, the president refuses the oath, there has been a physical confrontation, and both sides are already using the conflict in the run-up to the 2027 parliamentary elections. Tusk also links the unrest to Russian attempts at destabilization; that same week there was a report of a “provocation” with flashlights on the border with Kaliningrad. The timing stands out, but does not explain the underlying institutional struggle.
OIM way out
Do not adopt one framing.
Do not treat the other framing as the end.
Instead: what exactly is in the decisions of 30 October.
Who is a judge according to which standard.
Which earlier rulings (from the tribunal itself and from EU courts) exist.
What has and has not been investigated.
Verifiable records and chronology above a story that rides the election cycle.
Question for you
How often have you seen an institutional conflict stay quiet for years…
only to return later with police at the door and two conflicting websites?
This post is 100% authentic and verifiable via:
https://openinternetmanifest.org/en/hash-verifier
### RVN: Poland – the tribunal and the waves
Since the end of October, police have been standing in front of the Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw. Protests with Polish flags. A president who turns around mid-flight from Senegal in the middle of the night and forces his way in. A judge who “suspends” the president of the tribunal.
On one side: Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his pro-European coalition. They say they are restoring the rule of law after years of PiS influence. On the other side: President Karol Nawrocki (PiS ally) and the opposition. They speak of a “forcible takeover” and a “coup d’état”.
This is not a new conflict. It is a new wave in a conflict that has been running since 2015. And it is not just about judges: it determines who will be able to legally test or block the 2027 elections.
### What was already there
In 2015 the outgoing Sejm (under PO-PSL) elected five judges to the tribunal, including two seats that only became vacant later. The tribunal itself later ruled that three of those five appointments were valid, two were not. PiS ignored that, elected its own judges, and President Duda swore them in. Laws followed that hindered the functioning of the tribunal. EU courts later questioned its independence.
Since 2023 the Tusk government has been trying to reverse that. Nawrocki, narrowly elected in 2025, refuses to administer the oath to several judges elected by the Sejm. The sitting president of the tribunal, Bogdan Święczkowski (from the PiS period), does not allow them in.
On 30 October 2026 Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska (elected by the Sejm, oath not accepted by the president) posted a notice on the website: she suspends Święczkowski and his deputy for one month and takes over. Police appeared. Nawrocki turned around, arrived around 1 a.m. and went inside. The tribunal’s X account spoke of an unlawful takeover of the website.
### The pattern
2015: one majority appoints “in advance”, the other majority cancels and fills the seats.
Years after: silence in media outside Poland, while the tribunal largely stops functioning or becomes politicized.
2023: new government promises restoration.
2025: new president blocks.
2026: physical confrontation in front of the building, online stories about “rule of law” versus “coup”.
The same mechanism as in other dossiers. First institutional capture. Then silence or framing. Then a new document or a new action. Then the opposite framing again.
### What this means
A suspension on a website is not an irrevocable court ruling.
A nocturnal entry by the president is not proof of a coup.
A police cordon is not proof of restored independence.
What is established: the authority of the judges has been contested since 2015, the president refuses the oath, there has been a physical confrontation, and both sides are already using the conflict in the run-up to the 2027 parliamentary elections. Tusk also links the unrest to Russian attempts at destabilization; that same week there was a report of a “provocation” with flashlights on the border with Kaliningrad. The timing stands out, but does not explain the underlying institutional struggle.
### OIM way out
Do not adopt one framing.
Do not treat the other framing as the end.
Instead: what exactly is in the decisions of 30 October.
Who is a judge according to which standard.
Which earlier rulings (from the tribunal itself and from EU courts) exist.
What has and has not been investigated.
Verifiable records and chronology above a story that rides the election cycle.
**Question for you**
How often have you seen an institutional conflict stay quiet for years…
only to return later with police at the door and two conflicting websites?
#Poland #RuleOfLaw #Tribunal #Transparency #RealityVsNarrative #RVN #OpenInternetManifest
https://openinternetmanifest.org
This post is 100% authentic and verifiable via:
https://openinternetmanifest.org/en/hash-verifier
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